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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
I. RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The major issues which are presented in this section are
the result of two recent decisions by the United States Su-
preme Court. In Kirby v. Illinois1 the right to counsel was
restricted when the majority of the court held that it was not
required at pre-indictment lineups. The defendant, when
stopped on the street for interrogation in relation to another
crime, produced stolen credit cards and travelers' checks while
searching for his identification. Kirby was arrested and taken
to the police station where he was identified by the robbery
victim. A pre-trial motion to suppress the identification
testimony was denied and the defendant was convicted. He
appealed contending that the per se exclusionary rule to iden-
tification testimony based upon a police station lineup (that
was formulated in United States v. Wade and Gilbert v. Cali-
fornia) 2 should be applied.
The majority of the court found that the right to counsel
only attaches at or after the time that adversary judicial pro-
ceedings have been initiated against the defendant and that
this absolute constitutional guarantee is not to be applied to
a routine police investigation. The court, believing that the
Wade-Gilbert per se exclusionary rule was meant to apply to
only post indictment lineups, refused to extend the rule to
pre-indictment confrontations.
Four Justices entered a very spirited dissent, holding
that the Wade-Gilbert per se- exclusionary rule was not re-
stricted to post-indictment lineups and should be applied here
to reverse the lower court. The dissent stated that there is
grave potential for prejudice, intentional or not, in the pre-
trial lineup and unless the assistance of counsel is required,
the trial itself may be reduced to a mere formality. The ra-
tionale discovered and applied by the majority was that the
pre-indictment lineup is not a critical stage but a mere pre-
1. 40 U.S.L.W. 4607 (U.S. June 7, 1972).
2. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388
U.S. 263 (1967). These cases held that a pretrial lineup was a critical stage
of the criminal prosecution, and that in-court identifications based on a lineup
where the defendant was unrepresented by counsel were per se excluded.
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paratory step in the gathering of the prosecution's evidence.
The dissent found the sole purpose of such confrontations to
be for the accumulation of proof to buttress the conclusion by
the police that the individual in custody was the offender.
While the court declined to apply the Wade-Gilbert rule
retroactively in Stovall v. Denno,3 it did not so much as hint
that the rule applied only to confrontations after the accused
had been indicted and "... at one point the Court summa-
rized Wade as holding 'that the confrontation [for identifica-
tion] is a critical stage, and that counsel is required at all
confrontations.' ',4 Although Wade and Gilbert involved post-
indictment lineups, the dissent found no indication that the
decisions turned on that particular circumstance. The minority
did not think the Wade-Gilbert rule required extension because
they found it to cover all lineups. In closing the dissenting
Justices stated:
... [I~t is fair to conclude that rather than "declin[ing] to depart
from [the] rationale" of Wade and Gilbert ... the plurality today,
albeit purporting to be engaged in "principled constitutional adjudica-
tion" . . . refuses even to recognize that "rationale." For my part, I
do not agree that we "extend" Wade and Gilbert ...by holding that
the principles of those cases apply to confrontations for identification
conducted after arrest. Because [prosecuting witness] testified at trial
about his identification of petitioner at the police station show up,
the exclusionary rule of Gilbert ... requires reversal. 5
The United States Supreme Court significantly extended
the constitutional right to counsel in Argersinger v. Hamlin6
when it held that absent a knowing and intelligent waiver,
no person may be imprisoned unless he was represented by
counsel at his trial. The defendant, an indigent, was tried and
convicted for an offense punishable by imprisonment up to
six months, a fine of $1000 or both, and given a 90 day jail
sentence without the benefit of counsel. The lower court, in
ruling on the right to counsel, based its decision on Duncan v.
Louisiana7 involving the right to trial by jury, holding that
the right to court appointed counsel extends only to trials for
non-petty offenses punishable by more than six months im-
prisonment.
3. 388 U.S. 293 (1967). The lineup involved in this case was pre-indictment.
4. 40 U.S.L.W. at 4614, quoting from 388 U.S. at 298.
5. 40 U.S.L.W. at 4615.
6. 40 U.S.L.W. 4679 (U.S. June 12, 1972).
7. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
[Vol. 2.4
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In reversing the lower court, the Supreme Court held that
the right to counsel is not governed by whether or not a jury
trial is required or by the classification of the offense. The
court recognized the burden it was placing on the states and
the judicial system but it felt that the serious repercussions,
affecting a person's career and reputation, which result from
even a short imprisonment justified its decision.
The right to counsel where loss of liberty is not involved
was not considered, although there are serious situations, such
as loss of drivers license, etc., in which the assistance of coun-
sel could be most helpful. However, it seems imminent that the
constitutional right to counsel will soon extend to trials in
which the loss of liberty is not involved.
II. MISTRIAL
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v.
Walden8 held that the second prosecution of the defendants
after the first trial was unnecessarily aborted constituted
double jeopardy in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The
trial judge had terminated the first trial without manifest
necessity after two jurors observed one or more defendants
in handcuffs at a recess. Counsel for the defendants suggested
numerous curative measures, but the court declined them and
refused further investigation into the matter. The trial judge
based his action on Holmes v. United States9 when he sug-
gested that the defendants move for a mistrial. After the
motion for mistrial was made by four defendants and the
motion to sever by the other six was denied, the judge declared
a mistrial.
For over a hundred years the development of the case
law has been that the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth
Amendment prohibits a second trial after the first has been
aborted without the defendant's consent, unless there was
"manifest necessity" for doing so.10 However, the double jeop-
ardy clause has not been considered an absolute bar to second
trial because the defendants' rights were balanced against
"the public's interest in fair trials designed to end in just
judgments."' 1
8. 448 F2d 925 (4th Cir. 1971).
9. 284 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1960).
10. United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824).
11. Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 (1949).
19721
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In Walden the judge had acted only out of a sincere de-
sire to protect the rights of the defendants and without inten-
tion to harass or oppress them when he originally declared
the mistrial. At the second trial, the judge was doubtlessly led
by a previous decision of the Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals12 and he denied the plea of double jeopardy. Subsequent
to his ruling, the United States Supreme Court made a sig-
nificant departure from prior controlling case law in order to
reduce the occasions on which criminal defendants may be
made to face prosecution twice. In United States v. Jorn 3 the
court held that the trial judge must not "foreclose the defen-
dant's option (to have his trial completed by a particular
tribunal) until a scrupulous exercise of judicial discretion led
to the conclusion that the ends of public justice would not be
served by a continuation of the proceeding."'14 The Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals thinks that Jorn all but eliminates
a trial judge's motivation as an element of consideration in
determining whether an aborted trial bars a second prosecu-
tion. The judge's motivation was beyond reproach, but he
failed to exhaust all other reasonable possibilities before de-
ciding to foreclose the defendants' option to proceed. In light
of Jorn the court found that the scrupulous exercise of discre-
tion, requiring the judge to seek out and consider all avenues
of cure to avoid trial abortion, was not performed, therefore
the six defendants who did not move for mistrial were entitled
to a judgment of acquittal.
The harder problem was deciding what should be done
about the four defendants who did move for the mistrial. The
court certainly could not allow defendants to actively seek a
mistrial and by doing so thereafter prevent any trial at all,
but here the motion, albeit with the best of motivation, was
solicited by the judge. By inquiring into the circumstances
surrounding the entry of the motion, the Fourth Circuit court
determined that actual "consent" to the declaration of a mis-
trial was not present. The suggestion to counsel to make the
motion coupled with the refusal to adequately consider other
possible cures, while not intimidating the defendants into con-
senting, destroyed any real effective option on their part. By
pressing solicitation and by blocking other possible methods
12. United States v. Smith, 390 F.2d 420 (4th Cir. 1968).
13. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 (1971).
14. Id. at 485.
[ ol. 24
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of cure, the defendants' voluntariness in this action was di-
minished and they were put to an incomplete and uninformed
choice. The court held that the mistrial was effectively de-
clared as to all defendants prior to the ceremonial motions
made by these four defendants and therefore the double jeop-
ardy clause of the Fifth Amendment applied to everyone at
the second trial.
In State v. Tuckness'15 the defendant, who was convicted
of assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature and
assault with intent to ravish, alleged that the trial judge com-
mitted error by failing to grant a mistrial after he had made
comments to one of the defendant's witnesses. Upon seeing
the psychiatrist smiling during cross-examination, the trial
judge rebuked him in order to impress upon him the gravity
of the trial.
This court has held previously that a motion for mistrial
lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge,'0 and that
his ruling will only be overturned when there is abuse of dis-
cretion amounting to an error of law.' 7 The court on these
facts quoted the following:
Generally, the act of a judge in a criminal case in admonishing, rebuk-
ing, or warning a witness because of the latter's language or conduct
is not such misconduct as to require a new trial. The court may reprove
or rebuke a witness for levity or profanity, and it is proper for him
to correct the volubility of a witness and admonish those who show
hesitation, reluctance, or evasion.18
The court overruled this exception by the appellant because
he failed to show either error or resulting prejudice. Judges
have a great deal of discretion in this area because they have
the duty of conducting the trial in an orderly manner and
insuring that proper decorum is maintained during the trial.
III. DOUBLE JEOPARDY
In State v. Greuling'9 the South Carolina Supreme Court
considered the question of whether conspiracy and accessory
before the fact with respect to the same substantive crime
15. 257 S.C. 295, 185 S.E.2d 611 (1971).
16. Riddle-Duckworth Inc. v. Sullivan, 253 S.C. 411, 171 S.E.2d 486 (1969).
17. Crocker v. Weathers, 240 S.C. 412, 126 S.E2d 335 (1962).
18. 58 Am. JuR. 2D New Trial §54 (1971).
19. 257 S.C. 515, 186 S.E.2d 706 (1972).
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constitute separate offenses or only one offense. By a three to
two decision, the court found that each offense charged in-
volved proof of a necessary element which the other did not,
therefore the offenses are separate and distinct so as to permit
trial and conviction under the same indictment, although they
arise out of the same transaction. The test applied by the
majority in arriving at its decision is popularly known as
the "same evidence" test.20 Through the use of this test, the
court found the offenses of criminal conspiracy and accessory
before the fact constitute separate and distinct offenses. They
stated that:
In conspiracy, an unlawful combination must be shown, which is not
necessary in establishing the offense of accessory before the fact. In
accessory before the fact, it must be shown that defendant aided, coun-
selled or encouraged the actual commission of the crime, which is
unnecessary to the establishment of a conspiracy. Each offense there-
fore contains elements not necessary to the proof of the other.21
While the majority based its decision on United States
Supreme Court decisions 22 for the proposition that the double
convictions did not offend the double jeopardy clause of the
Federal Constitution, the dissenting justices relied on the de-
cisions of numerous state courts of last resort2 3 in finding
double jeopardy to be a bar to the prosecution of the two
offenses. The dissent contended that the court should make
an interpretation of the double jeopardy provision of the
South Carolina Constitution, without detracting from the
minimum standards for protection of individual and human
rights established by the United States Supreme Court in its
federal constitutional decisions. Also through application of
the "same evidence" test, the dissent concluded that the of-
fense of conspiracy contains no element which is not a neces-
sary element of the offense of accessory before the fact, and
20. In State v. Switzer, 65 S.C. 187, 43 S.E. 513 (1903) this court recog-
nized that such rule, while generally useful and adequate, was not infallible.
Research indicates that in more recent years the test has been subjected to a
great deal of criticism by jurists and writers. Whitton v. State, 479 P.2d 302
(1970); People v. De Sisto, 27 Misc. 2d 217, 214 N.Y.S. 2d 858 (1961).
21. 257 S.C. at 524, 186 S.E.2d at 710.
22. Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338 (1911) ; Pinkerton v. United
States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946); Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1 (1954).
23. State v. Bell, 205 N.C. 225, 171 S.E. 50 (1933); State v. Muntzing,
146 W. Va. 878, 122 S.E.2d 851 (1961); State v. McNeil, 161 Wash. 221, 296
P. 555 (1931).
[Vol. 24
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that prosecution for both was in violation of Article I, Section
17 of the South Carolina Constitution (double jeopardy
clause).
In State v. Hoffman 24 the appellant was arrested and
charged with (1) making excessive noise, (2) speeding, and
(3) failure to stop when signaled to do so by an officer of
the law. After an acquittal on the first two charges, the ap-
pellant was indicted and found guilty of the third offense.
Hoffman interposed the plea of double jeopardy as a bar to
the prosecution based on his previous acquittals. Even though
the United States Supreme Court has decided that the double
jeopardy clause of the federal constitution is applicable to
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, this holding
does not affect the settled rule that the provisions against
double jeopardy apply only to a second prosecution for the
same act and crime, both in law and fact, for which the first
prosecution was instituted.
The test generally applied is whether the evidence neces-
sary to support the second indictment would have been suf-
ficient to procure a legal conviction upon the first indictment.
When two separate and distinct crimes are committed in the
same transaction, the prohibition against double jeopardy
does not apply just because the crimes are so closely connected
in point of time that it is impossible to separate the evidence
related to them. Since the evidence necessary to prove the
offenses of speeding and making excessive noise would not be
sufficient to convict the appellant of failure to stop when sig-
naled by a law officer, double jeopardy would not act as a
bar to the second prosecution.
IV. JUDGE AND SOLICITOR
In State v. Addis25 the defendant was convicted of invol-
untary manslaughter and brought this appeal, contending
that the participation by a private attorney in the prosecution
of his case deprived him of equal protection of the law and
was a denial of due process. Prior to the criminal trial the
prosecuting attorney had represented the family of the de-
ceased in settling a civil claim against the defendant, there-
fore Addis moved that the attorney not be permitted to
24. 257 S.C. 461, 186 S.E.2d 421 (1972).
25. 257 S.C. 482, 186 S.E.2d 415 (1972).
1972]
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participate.26 The court found the code sections cited by the
defendant were designed to control the activities of the so-
licitor and that when a private attorney participates in the
trial of a case and does only what a solicitor should do, the
defendant has no right to complain. The court noted that the
weight of authority appears to be in keeping with its decision
that the participation of private counsel, hired by any persons
interested in securing a conviction does not violate the con-
stitution or any statutory or common law principle.
In State v. Best 27 the State appealed, questioning the ac-
tion of the trial judge who had changed and suspended the
sentences he imposed on the respondents after the term of
court had terminated. The prosecution of the three defendants
arose out of a riotous incident at the Lamar schools and they
were tried and convicted. After the expiration of the term of
court, the trial judge was approached concerning the modifi-
cation of the respondent's sentences, and he agreed to keep
the case under review and further stated that he would retain
jurisdiction of the case. Subsequently the trial judge modified
the sentences and then after reassignment to a different cir-
cuit, he further suspended the sentences, all of this being done
without notification to the State.
Under the South Carolina judicial system the presiding
judge in the circuit court loses jurisdiction with the adjourn-
ment of the term28 therefore he is without authority to change,
amend, or modify any sentence previously imposed. In decid-
ing this case the South Carolina Supreme Court relied on its
previous holding in Shillito v. City of Spartanburg,29 quoting
from it as follows:
26. S.C. CODE ANN. §17-1 (1962), provides:
How criminal action prosecuted.-A criminal action is prose-
cuted by the State, as a party, against a person charged with a
public offense, for the punishment thereof.
S.C. CODE ANN. §17-2 (1962), provides:
Prosecuting officer not to accept fees, etc.-No prosecuting
officer shall receive any fee or reward from or in behalf of a
prosecutor for services in any prosecution or business which it
is his offcial business to attend, nor be concerned as counsel or
attorney for either party in a civil action depending upon the
same state of facts.
27. 257 S.C. 361, 186 S.E.2d 272 (1972).
28. Id. at 275, citing State v. Thompson, 122 S.C. 407, 115 S.E. 326 (1922).
29. 215 S.C. 83, 54 S.E.2d 521 (1949).
[Vol. 24
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Any designated judge who has held court in another circuit than his
own, has the power, notwithstanding his absence from such circuit,
to decide all matters which have been submitted to him within such
circuit, decide motions for new trials duly made, or perform any other
act required by law or the rules of the court in order to prepare any
case so tried by him for review in an appellate court.
But the jurisdiction and power of a circuit judge goes no farther. The
rule does not contemplate that after he has left the circuit he shall
decide any matter which has not been submitted to or heard by him
while holding court in such circuit. No authority is given to him to
hear and determine new matter, even though such matter may arise
in the same case.
3 0
Even though there was no motion pending before the
judge to change the sentences at the time he left the circuit,
the respondents contended that the time, place, manner, and
extent to which sentences are suspended are exclusive matters
for the trial judge, and the fact that he has left the circuit is
no impediment to the exercise of this power by him. The court
disagreed with this argument and based its holding on section
55-591 of the South Carolina Code of Laws, stating that the
judge of any court of record with criminal jurisdiction is
authorized to suspend the execution of the sentence only at
the time of sentence.
The South Carolina Supreme Court, in the interest of the
orderly administration of justice, reversed the orders of the
trial judge and in concluding their opinion appropriately
quoted from the United States Supreme Court:
[W] e would be reluctant to hold that the court has a continuing power
on his own initiative to grant what the defendant has not the right
to go into open court and ask. To approve the practice followed in
this case would almost certainly subject trial judges to private appeals
and application by counsel or friends of one convicted. We think that
expiration of the time in which relief can openly be asked of the judge,
terminates the time within which it can properly be granted on the
court's own initiative.. .31
V. SENTENCING
In Wood v. State32 the defendant, following his plea of
guilty to two counts charging telephonic communications in
violation of statute, was sentenced to five years on each count
30. Id. at 85, 54 S.E2d at 522-3.
31. United States v. Smith, 331 U.S. 469 (1947).
32. 257 S.C. 179, 184 S.E.2d 702 (1971).
9
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to run concurrently. Thereafter, he appealed contending the
sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment within the
meaning of Article I, Section 19 of the South Carolina Con-
stitution. The charge of unconstitutionality was addressed
only to the sentence, not to the statute under which it was
imposed. The court thereby avoided the issue as to whether
the sentencing was unconstitutional and affirming the lower
court concluded by stating:
It is well settled in this State that this Court has no jurisdiction to
disturb, because of alleged excessiveness, a sentence which is within
the limits prescribed by statute unless: (a) the statute itself violates
the constitutional injunction ... against cruel and unusual punish-
ment, or (b) the sentence is the result of partiality, prejudice or
pressure or corrupt motive. 3
The South Carolina Supreme Court in McLamore v.
State34 considered the issue of whether sentencing a defendant
to the public works of the county or in the alternative to serve
his time in the State Penitentiary was an unconstitutional
delegation of judicial authority. This was a class action in
which the appellant purported to litigate in behalf of all per-
sons serving sentences of six months or more in the county
prison camps of Richland County. The appellant did not seek
release from confinement but wanted section 17-554 of the
South Carolina Code of Laws3 5 declared an unconstitutional
delegation of judicial authority, contrary to the South Caro-
lina Constitution.3
0
The appellant had been sentenced to labor upon the pub-
lic works of Richland County for a period of nine years or be
confined to hard labor at the State Penitentiary for a like
period. After this it was the county supervisor, who in his sole
33. Id. at 182, 184 S.E.2d at 703.
34. 257 S.C. 413, 186 S.E.2d 250 (1972).
35. §17-554 provides:
Able-bodied male convicts to work on county or municipal chain-
gangs. In every case in which imprisonment is provided as the
punishment . . all able-bodied male convicts shall be sentenced
to hard labor on the public works of the county ... and in the
alternative to imprisonment in the county jail or State Peni-
tentiary at hard labor ....
36. S.C. CONST. art. V, §33, provides: "Sentence to labor on highways.
Circuit courts and all Courts inferior thereto and municipal courts shall have
the power, in their discretion, to impose sentence of labor upon highways, streets
and other public works upon persons by them sentenced to imprisonment."
[Vol. 24
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discretion, selected the prisoner to be assigned to the county
prison camp. It is the selection of prisoners by the county
supervisor which the appellant argued was an unconstitutional
delegation of judicial authority in violation of the constitution.
The appellant contended that the judge was required by the
constitution to exercise a discretion and determine where he
should serve his sentence, and that this authority could not
be delegated.
In affirming the lower court, the supreme court held that
the judge had not delegated his authority. The constitutional
provision in question was construed to require the judge to
use discretion in whether to sentence the appellant to hard
labor, but the constitution does not impose upon the trial
judge a duty beyond that imposed by statute. The court held
that the legislature had conferred the duty upon the county
supervisor of determining where the defendant's sentence
would be served, and that it had not been delegated to him
by the judge.
The next two cases deal with the sentencing of youthful
offenders. In Ballard v. State 37 the nineteen year old defen-
dant was on a two year probation period for a suspended
sentence of breaking and entering when he pleaded guilty to
burglary. Counsel for the defendant requested that sentencing
be imposed under the Youthful Offender Act 38 but in view of
the breach of probation the trial court refused.
On appeal the defendant contended that in the light of
section 55-395 (d) of the South Carolina Code of Laws (Youth-
ful Offender Act),39 the court abused its discretion in failing
to sentence him as requested. The defendant made a novel
argument in urging that the statute makes it obligatory upon
the court to find specifically that a youthful offender will not
derive benefit from treatment before the court may impose
sentence under any other applicable penal provisions. The
defendant further urged that the evaluation must be of the
same quality as that provided by the reception and evaluation
center under the Act,40 and that the trial judge's cursory con-
37. 258 S.C. 91, 187 S.E.2d 224 (1972).
38. S.C. CoDF ANN. §55-395 (Supp. 1969).
39. §55-395(d) "If the court shall find that the youthful offender will not
derive benefit from treatment, then the court may sentence the youthful of-
fender under any other applicable penal provision."
40. S.C. CODE ANN. §55-395(b) (Supp. 1969).
19721
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sideration was an abuse of discretion. The court rejected this
argument in holding there is no requirement that the judge
make specific factual findings or observations and evaluation
as provided by statute. Having heard the defendant's admis-
sion of guilt and having seen his record this court found no
abuse of discretion in refusing to impose sentence under the
Youthful Offender Act.
Also in State v. McKinley41 a sixteen year old defendant
appealed his imprisonment in the Department of Corrections.
The appeal was based on section 55-50.30 of the South Caro-
lina Code of Laws which prescribes that no child under the
age of seventeen shall be committed to any penal institution
other than the Board of Juvenile Corrections or the Board
of Juvenile Placement and Aftercare. The lower court de-
clared this provision arbitrary and irrational due to the un-
availability of adequately secure correctional facilities within
the Board of Juvenile Corrections and thereupon did not find
this statutory provision of binding effect upon the inherent
sentencing power of that Court.
The supreme court reversed, finding the commitment
contrary to the law, and declared that the court has no in-
herent authority to sentence anyone convicted of a crime to
the South Carolina Department of Corrections without statu-
tory authorization.
There were three cases decided during this reporting pe-
riod which reversed the sentence of death because the statu-
tory law had the effect of making it applicable only to those
defendants who asserted their right to plead not guilty. In
Thomas v. Leeke42 the defendant was found guilty of rape
and sentenced to death when the jury did not recommend
mercy. On petition for habeas corpus the circuit court re-
manded the case for resentencing as if the jury had recom-
mended mercy to the court and the State had appealed. The
defendant argued that his constitutional rights to plead not
guilty and to demand a jury trial were infringed upon by the
combination of two sections of the South Carolina Code of
Laws.
43
41. 257 S.C. 82, 184 S.E2d 80 (1971).
42. 257 S.C. 491, 186 S.E.2d 516 (1970).
43. S.C. CODE ANx. §16-72 (1962) provides:
Punishment for rape or assault with intent to ravish.-Any
person convicted of rape or assault with intent to ravish shall
[Vol. 24
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As a result of a 1968 United States Supreme Court case,
44
our supreme court invalidated section 17-553.4 of the code in
State v. Harper.45 In Jackson the court said that ". . . the
evil in the . . . statute is not that it necessarily coerces guilty
pleas and jury waivers but simply that it needlessly encour-
ages them";46 Thomas maintained that the South Carolina
statutes held out a similar enticement in 1965 to him. In
reversing the circuit court and rejecting the defendant's argu-
ment, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that the enact-
ment of the statute had not affected the accused's right to
avoid the death penalty. The court, finding that section 17-
553.4 had conferred no new rights on the accused but was
designed only to facilitate procedure, stated:
Prior to 1962 in a capital case if the State elected not to pursue
the death penalty, and the accused wished to enter a guilty plea, the
procedure was to empanel a jury and instruct it to write the verdict
"guilty with recommendation to mercy." From 1962 to 1968 the same
result was accomplished, if the State did not wish to ask for the death
penalty and the accused wished to plead guilty, by merely having him
sign a guilty plea.
Before the 1962 amendment and after the amendment an accused
person's chances of avoiding the death penalty were the same. At both
times he could enter a lesser plea only if the court accepted the same.
4 7
The court ruled that the amendment had created no im-
permissible burden on Thomas and that the ruling on Jackson
did not apply.
However, on writ of certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court, this decision was reversed and remanded for
sentencing as proposed by the circuit court. Since the Court
suffer death unless the jury shall recommend him to the mercy
of the court in which event he shall be confined at hard labor
in the State Penitentiary for a term not exceeding forty years
nor less than five years, at the discretion of the presiding judge.
S.C. CoDE ANN. §17-553.4 (1962) prior to invalidation provided:
Sentencing in case of guilty pleas.-In all cases where by law
the punishment is affected by the jury recommended the accused
to the mercy of the court, and a plea of guilty is accepted with
the approval of the court, the accused shall be sentenced in like
manner as if the jury in a trial had recommended him to the
mercy of the court.
44. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
45. 251 S.C. 379, 162 S.E2d 712 (1968).
46. 390 U.S. at 583.
47. 257 S.C. at 497, 186 S.E2d at 518.
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reversed without opinion and cited Jackson as its basis it
must be assumed that other sentences based on these statutes
could be subject to reversal.
In State v. Cannon48 and State v. Hamilton49 the defen-
dants were found guilty of rape and murder respectively and
sentenced to death. These sentences were rendered under the
statutes previously discussed, so in light of the reversal of
Thomas v. Leeke 0 the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed
the death sentences and remanded the defendants for sen-
tencing as though the jury had returned a verdict with the
recommendation of mercy.
VI. BAIL
In DeAngelis v. State' ,the petitioner, while on a 120-day
grace period by the Lexington County Court to get his busi-
ness affairs in order before serving his sentence, was found
guilty of three additional crimes. After an unsuccessful ap-
peal the South Carolina Supreme Court and a subsequent
denial by that court on a petition for rehearing and a motion
for bond pending determination of a petition for certiorari
to be filed with the Supreme Court of the United States, the
petitioner sought bail pending a hearing on his plea for a
writ of habeas corpus. While there has been a great deal of
doubt through the years on this matter, the District Court
of South Carolina concluded that the power to release on bail
pending decision as to whether the writ should finally be
issued was a judicial function of the court to be discharged in
the exercise of judicial discretion.
The district court recognized that this power to grant
bail should be sparingly exercised due to the compelling in-
terests on the side of proceeding to execute the criminal judg-
ment but also recognized that there could be situations with
a substantial showing of countervailing circumstances to over-
ride or postpone that objective. This case is unique in that
the merits of the petition for habeas corpus had not yet been
determined, so based on the petitioner's prior record showing
a disregard for the sanctity of person and property, the court
48. 257 S.C. 425, 186 S.E.2d 413 (1972).
49. 257 S.C. 429, 186 S.E.2d 419 (1972).
50. See n. 42 muPra.
51. 330 F.Supp. 889 (D.S.C. 1971).
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denied his request for bail. Even though the district court has
recognized a petitioner's right to this form of relief, it appears
that an unusually strong justification will be necessary to
obtain it.
VII: JURY
In State v. icks and Thomas v. Leeke53 the defendants
appealed, alleging they were denied equal protection of the
law because the trial court excluded prospective jurors who
stated opposition to capital punishment. The test laid down
by the United States Supreme Court to guide lower courts in
determining whether a prospective juror is qualified or not is:
... a sentence of death cannot be carried out if the jury that im-
posed or recommended it was chosen by excluding veniremen for
cause simply because they voiced general objections to the death
penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples against its
infliction.5 4
After a review of the voir dire examination of the jurors,
the trial court determined that their opposition to capital
punishment was such as to prevent them from rendering a
verdict of guilty regardless of the evidence. Since the State
as well as the defendant is entitled to a fair trial, excusing the
jurors for cause within the narrowly prescribed grounds ac-
cepted by this court,55 was constitutionally permissible.
VIII. MISCELLANEOUS
In State v. Bennett56 the South Carolina Supreme Court
settled the often-raised contention that it is prejudicial error
to deny a defendant two trials, one on the question of guilt
and the other for determination of sentence. The decision was
based on a recent United States Supreme Court case5 7 which
held that a bifurcated trial is not required by the United
States Constitution.
52. 257 S.C. 279, 185 S.E.2d 746 (1971).
53. 257 S.C. 491, 186 S.E.2d 516 (1970).
54. Id. at 520, quoting from Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522
,(1969).
55. State v. Atkinson, 253 S.C. 531, 172 S.E2d 111 (1970).
56. 256 S.C. 234, 182 S.E2d 291 (1971).
57. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
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The question of the right to pretrial discovery in crim-
inal cases was considered in State v. Flood.58 The defendant
contended that the refusal to grant the discovery motion was
a denial of due process and a denial of a fair trial. While sec-
tions 43-231 et seq. of the South Carolina Code of Laws entitle
an accused person to a preliminary hearing in order to ap-
praise the nature of the State's evidence, there are no other
statutes or rules of court providing for discovery in criminal
cases. The court found no right to pretrial discovery at com-
mon law and therefore found no error in the ruling of the
trial judge.
IX. JUVENILE COURTS
The United States Supreme Court in Ivan v. New York
City59 considered whether the standard of proof, beyond a
reasonable doubt, should be applied retroactively. On March
31, 1970 In Re Winship0 held that proof beyond a reasonable
doubt was among the essentials of due process and fair treat-
ment that must be afforded the juvenile charged with a crime.
The court, believing the main purpose of Winship was to over-
come the aspect of a criminal trial that substantially impairs
the truth finding function, held that Winship should be given
complete retroactive effect.
ROBERT L. HALLMAN, JR.
58. 257 S.C. 141. 184 S.E2d 549 (1971).
59. 40 U.S.L.W. 3586 (U.S. June 13, 1972).
60. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
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